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ARGUMENT
L

The Findings of Fact Are Not in Question.

Respondent incorrectly argues that Petitioner has failed to marshal the evidence to
appropriately challenge the findings of fact issued by the ALJ and the Board, when that does
not apply here. The controlling findings of fact are not in dispute. Those that are in dispute
have no relevance on this appeal. Petitioner does not challenge the ALJ's findings of fact,
rather it challenges their application of the undisputed facts to the law. That challenge does
not require such marshaling of the facts as has been argued by Respondent. It is rather, the
application of the facts the ALJ used in justifying a denial of just cause to terminate an
employee which is an argument of law.
This employee was someone who deliberately broke a promise to the owner of the
company, and then went behind that owner's back to obtain "permission," not to break the
promise, but to rectify a situation she caused which breached the very obligation she had
promised to keep. It is not disputed that Ms. Mason had an extensive problem clocking in
and out. She was the single worst offender in the entire company. It is not disputed that she
had been reprimanded for that problem because of her repeated offenses of the employer's
policy. It is not disputed that in an attempt to correct the problem, a promise had been
exacted of her by the owner of the company to not to forget to clock in and out. It is further
not disputed that she broke that promise. Those are the facts established in the record. While
there are other facts that support a reversal of the ALJ's decision, they are not relevant to this
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appeal. Those facts which are relevant are sufficient to establish just cause for termination.
And just cause for termination should have been found by the ALJ. It was a legal error for
the ALJ to fail to make that finding.
Respondent has introduced argument in reliance upon peripheral issues that while they
may tend to support it's desired conclusion, are not applicable to the actual appeal before the
Court. No matter how you spin it, Ms. Mason had been warned to correct her behavior. She
was the single worst offending employee. It was so bad that the owner/employer required
a promise that she comply with the employer's rules. She made that promise. Then she
broke it. She failed to correct her behavior even after warnings, and a final chance with an
accompanying promise. That is just cause enough for termination.
Additionally, there is the issue that she went behind her employer's back to obtain
"permission" to violate the promise to correct her failure. Without disclosure of the promise,
that "permission" was obtained through knowing, deceitful artistry. That also provides the
employer with sufficient just cause for her termination. The decision of the ALJ misapplied
the law and it should be reversed.
Petitioner readily recognizes that Ms. Mason claims she obtained permission from her
supervisor to clock in on a day she was not at work. But she never obtained permission to
break her promise to Mr. Timmons, who was her ultimate employer. She never disclosed to
her supervisor that such a promise even existed before she obtained the alleged "permission"
to clock in on a day she was not at work. That is just cause for termination. The facts
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relevant to the appeal are not in dispute, only their application to the law. Ms. Mason had
knowledge of the promise, that is not disputed. Ms. Mason certainly recognized that she
broke the promise, demonstrating her own culpability. Ms. Mason further had control over
whether or not she could break that promise. Harley Davidson had just cause to terminate
her employment. The decision of the ALJ and the Board should be reversed.
II.

Respondent Was Terminated for Just Cause.

The Unemployment Insurance Rules pertaining to Section 3 5 A-4-405(2)(a) of the Act
provide, in part that
"[a] separation is a discharge if the employer was the moving party in
determining the date the employment ended. Benefits shall be denied if the
claimant was discharged for just cause or for an act or omission in
connection with employment, not constituting a crime, which as
deliberate, willful, or wanton and adverse to the employer's rightful
interest. However, not every legitimate cause for discharge justifies a denial
of benefits. A just cause discharge must include some fault on the part of the
worker."
Utah Admin. Code R994-405-201 (2003) (emphasis added).
An employee is terminated for just cause if three factors are met: "(1) culpability, (2)
knowledge of expected conduct, and (3) control over the offending conduct." Nelson v.
Department of Employment Sec, 801 P.2d 158, 161 (Utah App. 1990); accord Grinnellv.
Board of Review, 732 P.2d 113, 114 (Utah 1987) (per curiam); see also Utah Admin. Code
994-405-202 (2005). All three elements are satisfied for both causes of termination. Each
of these three factors were met on several levels. They were met as she continued to fail to
clock in and out properly, they were met as she directly disobeyed her employer, and they
3

were met when she went behind her employer's back to obtain "permission" to correct her
failure.
Ms. Mason (the "Respondent" or the "employee") was repeatedly told that she must
clock in when she arrived to work and clock out when she left. The employee was repeatedly
told this because she failed to clock in or clock out on numerous occasions. She was the
single worst offender. In fact, after having been reprimanded on the issue, she directly
promised her employer/owner that she would correct this behavior, but did not. Her failings,
if adopted by the general body of workers for the employer, would lead to chaos in the
company. This is not a trivial matter for the employer. The fact that a final chance to comply
was extended to Ms. Mason, along with getting her promise to comply, does not mean that
she was a good employee being treated unfairly. She could have been discharged when the
final warning was given. Instead, she promised to follow the company policy and to no
longer engage in filing false check-in/check-out records.
Respondent appears to argue that there could not be any fault in failing to clock in and
out. Respondent argues that simple forgetfulness could not amount to fault. The fact is, she
had forgotten to properly clock in and out so many times before that her employer had
addressed the matter directly with her. She had been reprimanded for this consistent
violation of the policy. She was the single worst offender in the company. She violated the
policy so many times, that her employer had exacted a promise of Ms. Mason that she would
not forget again. If this were a one time failure, these parties would not be before this Court.
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The established fact is, that Ms. Mason repeatedly had failed to obey the rules of her
employer. That failure, in and of itself, was sufficient to establish just cause for termination.
The policy is necessary to prevent chaos in record-keeping by the employer. If the policy
were allowed to go unenforced, it could lead to numerous labor violations or claims of labor
violations by the employer. It is a significant and necessary part of the company's right to
manage its affairs. And Ms. Mason was directly challenging and defying that right.
Additionally, however, she had another employee clock her in on July 23,2003, a day
when she admittedly did not work after she had made her promise. This also is just cause
for termination. Although the AL J found that the employee was told by a supervisor that she
could have another employee clock her in on a day she was not at work, she did not advise
the supervisor of her promise to the owner/employer when she allegedly obtained that
permission. In short, she lied to get permission. If she wanted permission, she should have
either gone to Mr. Timmons, or alternatively disclosed that the promise had been made to Mr.
Timmons and had her supervisor ask him. She did neither.
Both of these are grounds for termination.

There was a clear expectation of

performance that could be easily met by Ms. Mason. She failed to do so on several levels
providing the employer just cause for termination.
A.

Ms. Mason is Culpable.

The employee is definitely culpable. Rule 994-405-202(1) states in pertinent part:
"The conduct causing the discharge must be so serious that continuing the
employment relationship would jeopardize the employer's rightful interest. If
5

the conduct was an isolated incident of poor judgment and there was no
expectation that it would be continued or repeated, potential harm may not be
shown. The claimant's prior work record is an important factor in determining
whether the conduct was an isolated incident or a good faith error in
judgment."
Utah Admin. Code 994-405-202(1) (2005).
It was Ms. Mason that failed to properly clock in and out on July 21,2003. It was Ms.
Mason, and no other person, that had promised her employer that she would not forget to do
that again. It was Ms. Mason that went behind her employer's back to obtain "permission"
to have another employee clock her in on a day she was not at work. The conduct causing
the discharge was not a single isolated incident. It was a continued pattern of behavior for
which she had been warned and for which she had promised to correct. Failure to clock in
and out properly certainly jeopardizes an employer's rightful interests in having accurate
records and avoiding chaos in their compliance with employment laws. It causes additional
work to be done to correct those failures. It allows for the opportunity to be dishonest in
reporting time. It makes the employer's records inaccurate. It creates an element of distrust
between employer and employee.

It further demonstrates blatant disregard for the

employer's rules, regulations, and authority. It affects the ability to maintain discipline and
order in an employer's workplace, which is culpability.
Utah Administrative Rules further provide that unemployment benefits can be denied
for violation of employment rules, such as those violated by Ms. Mason. Pertinent portions
of Rule 994-405-208 of the Utah Administrative Code provide significant insight.

6

"(1) Violation of Company Rules.
If an individual violates a reasonable employment rule and the three elements
of culpability, knowledge and control are satisfied, benefits shall be denied.
(a) An employer has the prerogative to establish and enforce work rules that
further legitimate business interests. However, rules contrary to general public
policy or that infringe upon the recognized rights and privileges of individuals
may not be reasonable. If a worker believes a rule is unreasonable, the worker
generally has the responsibility to discuss these concerns with the employer
before engaging in conduct contrary to the rule, thereby giving the employer
an opportunity to address those concerns. When rules are changed, the
employer must provide appropriate notice and afford workers a reasonable
opportunity to comply.
(b) If an employment relationship is governed by a formal employment
contract or collective bargaining agreement, just cause may only be established
if the discharge is consistent with the provisions of the contract.
(c) Habitual offenses may not constitute disqualifying conduct if the acts were
condoned by the employer or were so prevalent as to be customary. However,
if a worker was given notice the conduct would no longer be tolerated, further
violations may result in a denial of benefits.
(d) Culpability may be established if the violation of the rule did not, in and of
itself, cause harm to the employer, but the lack of compliance diminished the
employer's ability to maintain necessary discipline."
Utah Admin. Code 994-405-208(1) (2005).
It certainly is reasonable to require employees to clock in and out, and such a rule
promotes the legitimate business interests of an employer, as mentioned above. Respondent
has argued that this was a habitual offense, and that it was condoned by the employer. The
offense was somewhat habitual as to this offending employee, having occurred fairly
regularly over the course of the almost two years Ms. Mason worked for Harley Davidson.
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But the employer never approved that practice and reprimanded her for the offenses. Ms.
Mason was warned on many occasions that such conduct could not be tolerated. Only to that
extent could it be argued that the fixing of the problem demonstrates "condoning" it. Ms.
Mason also testified that Mr. Timmons required a promise of her to correct her performance.
In other words, she was given notice the conduct would no longer be tolerated in accordance
with paragraph (c) of those rules. Id. at ^ (c).
Furthermore, she got other employees involved with the correction of her
disobedience only amplifies that Ms. Mason was causing the employer to maintain necessary
discipline. As paragraph (d) directly provides, that in and of itself establishes culpability. Id.
at 1j(d).
Were this a single incident of forgetfulness, the severity of forgetting to clock in and
out might not be sufficient to warrant termination. That is not this case, however. So such
an entirely hypothetical inquiry has no meaning here. The facts of the matter show that this
was not a single incident. Culpability is certainly demonstrated.
Respondent argues this failure may somehow be relieved by the alleged "permission"
she received from her supervisor to correct the failure. Breach of the promise to Mr.
Timmons occurred long before she ever obtained the alleged permission from her supervisor
to have another employee clock her in on a day she was not at work. That cannot have
happened when she never even disclosed the promise to the supervisor.

8

Furthermore, this was not an isolated incident, the employee had repeatedly been
warned to change this behavior. It was behavior of such an offensive nature and of such
concern to the employer that the employer sought for and obtained from the employee a
promise to never let it happen again. Therefore, there is no question the behavior was
"continued or repeated" by the employee. The first element should unquestionably be met.
B.

Ms. Mason Had the Requisite Knowledge.

The employee also had the required knowledge. Utah Administrative Code R994405-202(2) defines knowledge.
"The worker must have had knowledge of the conduct the employer expected.
There does not need to be evidence of a deliberate intent to harm the employer;
however, it must be shown that the worker should have been able to anticipate
the negative effect of the conduct. Generally, knowledge may not be
established unless the employer gave a clear explanation of the expected
behavior or had a written policy, except in the case of a violation of a universal
standard of conduct. A specific warning is one way to show the worker had
knowledge of the expected conduct. After a warning the worker should have
been given an opportunity to correct the objectionable conduct. If the employer
had a progressive disciplinary procedure in place at the time of the separation,
it generally must have been followed for knowledge to be established, except
in the case of very severe infractions, including criminal actions.
Ms. Mason's activities fit squarely within the definition provided for by the rule. Ms. Mason
certainly had knowledge of the conduct expected. She had been warned on several occasions
and had made a promise to properly clock in and out. At that time, as on prior occasions, she
received a clear explanation of the expected behavior. The promise also demonstrates the
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specific warning. There simply cannot be any question Ms. Mason knew she was to clock
in and out properly.
The employer had made repeated requests and warnings to the employee to clock in
and out correctly. This fact was referenced by the lower Court in it's decision. She should
have "been able to anticipate the negative effect of [her] conduct." See Utah Admin. Code
994-405-202(2) (2005). Ms. Mason testified during the hearing she understood it was a
problem for her to continue to fail to clock in and out correctly and both the employer and
the supervisor had instructed her it was their expectation she correct that behavior. See
Transcript p. 34, In. 22-42. Additionally, Mr. Hill (another employee), the supervisor, and
Mr. Timmons (the owner/employer) all testified that those conversations had taken place and
Ms. Mason knew of their expectations in that regard. See Transcript p 13, In. 20-31; p. 24,
In. 19-36; p. 30, In. 1-2. Each of them testified Ms. Mason was repeatedly verbally warned
she needed to clock in. When she failed to do so, and had another employee clock her in on
a day when she was not even working, she was terminated. That culminating event,
however, was after a long track record of failing repeatedly to conform to the requirements
for employment. The employer gave a clear explanation of the expected behavior, warnings
had previously been given, an ultimate warning given attached with a promise to correct the
objectionable behavior.

The fact she made this promise is ample evidence she had

knowledge of the behavior which needed correcting.
requirements.
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This satisfies the knowledge

C.

Ms. Mason Had Control of Her Decisions.

The employee's conduct was also within her control, the third requirement for a just
cause termination. Utah Admin. Code r994-405-202(3) defines control.
"(3) Control.
(a) The conduct causing the discharge must have been within the claimant's
control. Isolated instances of carelessness or good faith errors in judgment
are not sufficient to establish just cause for discharge. However, continued
inefficiency, repeated carelessness or evidence of a lack of care expected
of a reasonable person in a similar circumstance may satisfy the element
of control if the claimant had the ability to perform satisfactorily.
(b) The Department recognizes that in order to maintain efficiency it may be
necessary to discharge workers who do not meet performance standards. While
such a circumstance may provide a basis for discharge, this does not mean
benefits will be denied. To satisfy the element of control in cases involving a
discharge due to unsatisfactory work performance, it must be shown that the
claimant had the ability to perform the job duties in a satisfactory manner. In
general, if the claimant made a good faith effort to meet the job requirements
but failed to do so due to a lack of skill or ability and a discharge results, just
cause is not established."
This was not an isolated instance. This was continued inefficiency and repeated carelessness.
The definition requires the required performance be reasonable. It would certainly seem
reasonable for an employee who sells clothing and runs a cash register, to punch a time clock.
Millions of employees do that every day in this country. Imagine the chaos in the workplace
if this policy is adopted in Utah. It will make Utah employment records suspect, because
employees will no longer need to follow their employer's policy on accurate time record
keeping. Ms. Mason had the ability to clock in and out correctly. If a review was made of
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her overall performance of clocking in and out a very great percentage of the time would not
show any error in that performance. She had the ability to do it correctly, nevertheless, she
chose not to do so. Forgetfulness might have been an excuse prior to Ihe first warning,
maybe even the second, but such an excuse lacks credibility when it has been pointed out
many, many times. Control over her performance is demonstrated. It was also promised.
To not find that element satisfied is not reasonable.
II.

Having Met All Requirements, Ms. Mason Was Terminated With Just
Cause, and Benefits Should Be Denied.

Respondent lastly argues this is a situation where although discharge might have been
appropriate, denial of unemployment benefits is not. The cases cited in support of that
proposition are inapposite to this situation.

In the case of Buick v. Department of

Employment Sec., 752 P.2d 358 (Utah Ct. App. 1988), the employee was discharged after
failing to come to work and providing a questionable medical excuse for that failure. Judge
Orme found that case to "just barely" be within the realm of rationality. Id. The possibility
that there actually might have been a medical excuse allowed the Board to conclude
unemployment benefits should be awarded. Id. Unlike this case, there was no immediately
preceding warning to correct behavior, rather, the cause for termination was based upon one
incident. It is not even "just barely" rational or reasonable not to find just cause when an
employee directly breaches a commitment. To then obtain "permission" from another
supervisor, without disclosing the commitment, only adds fuel to the fire. Those alone
demonstrate just cause properly should have been found to terminate Ms. Mason.
12

Respondent next relies upon Northwest Foods v. Board of Review, 731 P.2d 470 (Utah
1986), to support the assertion Ms. Mason did not show volitional conduct in this case. In
Northwest Foods, the employee, who had a history of inappropriate emotional outbursts
while at work, was instructed to take a week long vacation. Id. Though she was not
instructed to stay away from her place of employment during that week, when she visited her
employment to pick up some personal items, her employer fired her. Id, Unlike in Northwest
Foods, where the employee did not know she wasn't supposed to do something, Ms. Mason,
was well aware of her promise. She simply chose to break it. Respondent states: "She
simply forgot, on occasion, to use the time clock properly. Although she promised to do
better, she forgot once more." See Respondent's Brief, p. 25. Those statements are not
entirely true. Ms. Mason did forget to use the time clock properly, a failure for which she
was warned specifically about. She did not promise just to do better, she promised to correct
the behavior. This was after several warnings. The once more, in combination with the other
issues that occurred, was not a small thing as Respondent argues. Nor was it outside of her
volitional control. Forgetfulness at that point was not a valid excuse.
Respondent next cites Logan Regional Hosp. v. Board of Review, 723 P.2d 427 (Utah
1986). In that case, the employee was responsible for three mishaps while maintaining the
boiler system of the Logan Regional Hospital. Id. The Board found that the mishaps were
the result of mistakes or accidents, and therefore an element of fault was lacking. Id. In this
case, the fault could only be attributed to Ms. Mason. Ms. Mason was the one responsible
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to keep her promise. Ms. Mason was the one responsible for clocking in and out properly.
She failed to do that, and the following sequence of events leads one to believe she attempted
to cover-up that breach. Forgetfulness simply cannot be an excuse forever.
Petitioner demonstrate sufficient facts to satisfy each element for a finding of just
cause surrounding the termination of Ms. Mason. The ALJ's holding was neither rational,
nor reasonable. It rewards cunning and deceit. It initiates a very dangerous precedent for
employers in Utah as they lose all hope of enforcing accurate record-keeping by their
employees. All an employee has to do to get out of a commitment to their employer is find
someone up the chain of command who will authorize the requested conduct and not disclose
the promise they made. Deceiving that person in the chain of supervisors is fine, and any
false or misleading manipulation will not matter so long as the employee can secure
"permission" to violate the policy, the promise and continue the conduct which has provoked
the warnings. Such a precedent is neither reasonable nor rational and it should not be upheld.
CONCLUSION
Pursuant to the foregoing arguments and law, Petitioner respectfully requests this
Court overrule the award of unemployment benefits made in Respondent's favor. Having
just cause for her termination, she should justly be denied any benefits resulting from her
dishonest behavior.
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DATED this

'/;

dav of November, 2005.
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